Published Mar 02, 2024 \u2022 Last updated 11 hours ago \u2022 10 minute read<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n OTTAWA \u2014 After being kept in the dark for years, we now know why<\/a> Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng were fired from Winnipeg\u2019s National Microbiology Lab (NML), Canada\u2019s highest security lab and the country\u2019s only facility authorized to handle deadly viruses such as Ebola.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The federal government released on Wednesday more than 600 pages of documents, including top-secret CSIS assessments, investigations and internal emails detailing the reasons why the scientists were fired, why the process took so long and why it was shielded in opacity for national security reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Advertisement 2<\/p>\n\n\n\n Story continues below<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Trending<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu was a prominent scientist educated in China whose research at the NML included pathogens that posed significant risk. She was credited with research breakthroughs on the deadly Ebola virus and awarded a Governor General\u2019s Innovation Award.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then one day in July 2019, she was suddenly escorted out of the lab and subsequently fired, along with her husband, Keding Cheng, who also worked at the lab. For nearly five years, Canadians were in the dark as to what had happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At one point, in 2021, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) was even found in contempt of Parliament<\/a> for refusing to hand over documents related to the mystery, despite a majority of MPs (not including the Liberals) demanding to see them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This week, we found out what was being kept so secret: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service alleges that Qiu \u201cdeveloped deep, cooperative relationships with a variety of People\u2019s Republic of China institutions and has intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC government.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n She had shipped sensitive materials outside of the national microbiology lab without approval to foreign countries, they alleged. And they accused her of actively covering up, or outright lying, about her affiliations with Chinese institutions. And they allege that Cheng, her husband, participated in leaking secure information and the deception around it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The National Post reviewed the 600 pages of investigations, assessments and emails, to put together a timeline of how the suspicions first arose, and how the security procedures subsequently played out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the documents, here\u2019s how it all went down:<\/p>\n\n\n\n PHAC is advised that Qiu appeared as a listed inventor of a Chinese patent that may contain scientific information produced at the Canadian Sciences Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) in Winnipeg, and that she shared the scientific data without permission. The patent was for an \u201cinhibitor for Ebola virus.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Allegations surface that Cheng potentially breached security policies regarding students under his supervision who tried to improperly remove laboratory materials from the CSCHAH.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One instance on Oct. 12, 2018, saw an attempted removal of two clear plastic bags, containing 10 vials each, by people known as \u201crestricted visitors.\u201d The incident on Oct. 31, 2018, saw other visitors accompanied by Cheng attempt to leave the CSCHAH with two empty Styrofoam containers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n F<\/p>\n\n\n\n r<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n PHAC\u2019s National Security Management Division contracts a private firm, Presidia Security Consulting, to conduct a fact-finding investigation into allegations involving Qiu and Cheng.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cheng creates a security incident by entering an incorrect passcode when he entered the CSCHAH. The code, it turned out, belonged to someone else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact-finding report conducted by Presidia Security Consulting finds that there were \u201cnumerous violations\u201d of the IT policy in the labs, including staff signing into computers and then allowing \u201crestricted visitors\u201d to download experimental data onto private Gmail accounts, emailing it to their homes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The report also reveals that in May 2018, Cheng was sent vials of mouse protein via courier from China marked as \u201ckitchen utensils\u201d. Cheng\u2019s explanation that the broker deliberately mislabelled the package shipped from China for ease of shipping satisfied the investigator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding Qiu\u2019s name appearing on the Chinese patent, the report found that top PHAC officials said that the likelihood of a researcher\u2019s name appearing on a patent without the researcher being aware of it was \u201chighly improbable\u201d and that misstating a researcher\u2019s name on a patent could rule it as invalid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu admitted that she had collaborated with the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control, which is attempting to develop an inhibitor to the Ebola virus, and sent them antibodies without an authorization, thus violating rules on intellectual property and material transfer agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The report also indicates that the investigator later learned that other antibodies were transferred to Thomas Jefferson University, a private postsecondary institution in Philadelphia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe current situation has the potential to tarnish the reputation of the CSCHAH, the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Minister of Health and is recommended for further investigation to determine the breadth of any breaches of policy,\u201d the report said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu and Cheng are each informed by the vice-president of the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch at PHAC that an administrative investigation into their actions is being launched and that they are to remain home with pay pending the results of the investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cShould it be determined that the allegations against you are founded, administrative and\/or disciplinary measures, up to and including termination of employment, may be taken,\u201d the letter said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Article content<\/p>\n\n\n\n The administrative investigation report on Qiu finds that she violated numerous intellectual-property policies set out by PHAC. While she did have permission to provide small amounts of antibodies to trusted people and organizations, she had been doing so without authorization for at least two years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu was found to have her name on not one, but two Chinese patents, the second being a \u201cdetection method,\u201d or test, for Marburg, a hemorrhagic fever similar to Ebola.<\/p>\n\n\n\n She claimed she had been listed without her knowledge, which made her \u201cangry,\u201d and she believed her research was not patentable because it was too weak.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Management at the National Microbiology Lab was not aware of the work she conducted on the two Chinese projects, the report said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The report also shows that she \u201cinappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information\u201d including to her personal computer and stored and shared data using unauthorized USB keys, despite being told not to use personal emails and data sharing multiple times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n A separate administrative investigation on Cheng found that he too violated directives on email management and gave access to unauthorized individuals to PHAC\u2019s IT system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, Cheng admitted to conducting work with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in China for a tick virus, which is outside of his scope of work, but said he did it out of his own self-interest, as the virus is deadly in his home province in China. The work was unknown to his supervisors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The report determined that Cheng had also been \u201cless than honest\u201d about the package labelled kitchen utensils, and the incident \u201ccalls into question his honesty and integrity.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Recommended from Editorial<\/p>\n\n\n\n A secret CSIS Act security assessment sent to PHAC\u2019s executive director of security reveals that Qiu and Cheng were listed as co-authors on an NML research paper that included individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOnline information states AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) and has offensive Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) capabilities,\u201d the document said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The CSIS assessment of Qiu and Cheng found that, although the service has no reason to suggest that both individuals would \u201cwillingly\u201d co-operate with a foreign power, they are both \u201csusceptible to influence by a foreign state\u201d that could result in information or materials leaving the lab.<\/p>\n\n\n\n CSIS assessed that there was a \u201cstrong possibility\u201d that both individuals would continue to violate policies and procedures should they regain access to the National Microbiology Lab.<\/p>\n\n\n\n CSIS sends another security assessment to PHAC revealing that it has uncovered new information which \u201cstrongly calls into question\u201d Qiu\u2019s loyalty to Canada.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu was \u201cassociated to multiple \u2018talent programs\u2019 administered and funded by various PRC entities, the most prominent one being the \u2018Thousand Talents Program (TTP)\u2019.\u201d The TTP recruits Chinese experts from western nations to boost China\u2019s national capabilities in science and technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Article content<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the TTP applications according to CSIS declares Qiu as the applicant and the Wuhan Institute of Virology as the declaring entity, stating that her work term was from 2019 to 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n TTP participants are given up to $1 million in research subsidies and may enjoy preferential PRC tax and visa treatment, housing subsidies and prioritized medical care in China, the report said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n CSIS also uncovered the existence of an unfinalized employment agreement between Hebei Medical University in China and Qiu from 2018 to 2022. Qiu graduated from an immunology program at Hebei Medical University, which is located in Shijiazhuang.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The agreement stipulated that she would be provided with funding of approximately $1.2 million and that her compensation would be the equivalent of $15,000 per month when onsite<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu listed the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Hebei Medical University, China\u2019s National Institute for Food and Drug Control and the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology in CVs that were provided for Chinese audiences, security investigators discovered. But she had omitted her Chinese links on her CV when she provided it to Canadian audiences, including in her applications at PHAC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n CSIS discovered that Qiu was nominated for an \u201cinternational cooperation award\u201d by China\u2019s Academy of Military Medical Sciences for using \u201cCanada\u2019s Level 4 Biosecurity Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens\u2026 and achieved brilliant results.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, CSIS uncovered an airline ticket for Qiu for travel to Beijing in April 2018, booked by an email address associated to CanSino, a Chinese vaccine company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n CSIS concluded that Qiu has developed \u201cdeep, cooperative relationships\u201d with PRC institutions and \u201cintentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC Government, and herself, without regard for the implications to her employer or to Canada\u2019s interests.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe Service therefore assesses that Ms. Qiu has engaged, may engage or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act,\u201d it concludes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An updated CSIS security assessment of Cheng in July 2020 \u201ccalls into question\u201d his reliability \u201cas it relates to loyalty\u201d given his \u201cclose personal and professional relationship\u201d with his wife, Qiu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/04b7f9691540d9d50004843421c5d936.safeframe.googlesyndication.com\/safeframe\/1-0-40\/html\/container.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The report reveals that Cheng was aware of his wife\u2019s applications to China-sponsored \u201ctalent programs,\u201d as well as her associations to PRC military institutes and related individuals, and that he was himself involved in an application for one of these \u201ctalent programs\u201d in 2013, although it is unclear what came of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n CSIS concluded that he could not credibly claim \u201ccomplete ignorance\u201d of his wife\u2019s activities, as he did in his security interviews with the spy agency, and that he was therefore \u201cnot truthful.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Both scientists file grievances to PHAC in which they allege that the investigative and disciplinary processes were in violation of their collective agreement, that they were not afforded procedural fairness, and that they were victims of discrimination because they are Chinese.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They claimed that they were asked specific and personal questions regarding their connections to China as a result of racial profiling, and said they were loyal Canadian citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qiu and Cheng are notified by Health Canada, in separate letters, that their respective security statuses are suspended immediately, as is their pay, pending a review for cause.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Story continues below<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"Xiangguo](\"https:\/\/smartcdn.gprod.postmedia.digital\/nationalpost\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/Xiangguo-Qiu-1.jpeg?quality=90&strip=all&w=288&h=216&sig=9rM117xU4Tw7MO-mMut6AQ\")
Article content<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
September 27, 2018<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
October 12 and 31, 2018<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"First](\"https:\/\/dcs-static.gprod.postmedia.digital\/15.5.2\/websites\/images\/newsletters\/icon-np-firstReading.svg\"){kind=icon}
<\/figure>\n\n\n\nDecember 21, 2018<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
January 27, 2019<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"The](\"https:\/\/smartcdn.gprod.postmedia.digital\/nationalpost\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/National-Microbiology-Lab-1-23.png?quality=90&strip=all&w=288&sig=AGhuhuGvJ2b45pWIjTFJxg\")
March 23, 2019<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
July 5, 2019<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
February 5, 2020<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n
April 9, 2020<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
June 30, 2020<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
July 7, 2020<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"Scientists](\"https:\/\/smartcdn.gprod.postmedia.digital\/nationalpost\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/microbiology-lab.jpg?quality=90&strip=all&w=288&sig=6qIznzHQKtzqHWMOw3dfUQ\")
August 5, 2020<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
August 20, 2020<\/h3>\n\n\n\n