CONSERVATIVES UNWITTINGLY HELPED THE LEFT UNDERMINE THE WEST

CONSERVATIVES UNWITTINGLY HELPED THE LEFT UNDERMINE THE WEST

• +1 more
• ANTHONY KOCH

For years, con­ser­vat­ives have com­for­ted them­selves with the illu­sion that the destruc­tion of the West was entirely the doing of the left. They have blamed pro­gress­ive ideo­logues, glob­al­ists, and uto­pi­ans for the failed exper­i­ment of mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism, the open bor­ders that reshaped their nations, and the cul­tural relativ­ism that hol­lowed out the moral found­a­tions of their soci­et­ies. But this is self-decep­tion. The truth is that the so-called right, the respect­able suit-and-tie centre-right parties that gov­erned most of the West for the bet­ter part of the last half-cen­tury, are just as respons­ible for the decay of our civil­iz­a­tion as their left-wing coun­ter­parts. They were not inno­cent observ­ers. They were in power, and they made the choices that brought us here.

For years, con­ser­vat­ives have com­for­ted them­selves with the illu­sion that the destruc­tion of the West was entirely the doing of the left. They have blamed pro­gress­ive ideo­logues, glob­al­ists, and uto­pi­ans for the failed exper­i­ment of mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism, the open bor­ders that reshaped their nations, and the cul­tural relativ­ism that hol­lowed out the moral found­a­tions of their soci­et­ies. But this is self-decep­tion. The truth is that the socalled right, the respect­able suit-and-tie centre-right parties that gov­erned most of the West for the bet­ter part of the last half-cen­tury, are just as respons­ible for the decay of our civil­iz­a­tion as their left-wing coun­ter­parts. They were not inno­cent observ­ers. They were in power, and they made the choices that brought us here.

In France, the Gaullists and their suc­cessors ruled for dec­ades under vari­ous names: the RPR, the UMP, and now Les Républicains. For much of the Fifth Repub­lic’s his­tory, the right, or what passed for it, held the pres­id­ency, the legis­lature, or both. And yet what did they con­serve? Immig­ra­tion surged but assim­il­a­tion col­lapsed. Mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism became ortho­doxy not because the French right was defeated in battle, but because it sur­rendered without a fight. The men who claimed to guard the Repub­lic’s iden­tity replaced con­vic­tion with cau­tion, sov­er­eignty with sym­bol­ism, and prin­ciple with polling. They preached integ­ra­tion but allowed the par­al­lel soci­et­ies of the ban­lieues to fester, all the while insist­ing that national unity could sur­vive as a slo­gan even as it dis­ap­peared as a lived real­ity. They spoke of sec­u­lar­ism and French val­ues yet aban­doned the expect­a­tion that new­comers — like gen­er­a­tions of suc­cess­ful immig­rants before them — must adopt and uphold the shared civic and cul­tural val­ues that made France what it is.

In France, the Gaullists and their suc­cessors ruled for dec­ades under vari­ous names: the RPR, the UMP, and now Les Républicains. For much of the Fifth Repub­lic’s his­tory, the right, or what passed for it, held the pres­id­ency, the legis­lature, or both. And yet what did they con­serve? Immig­ra­tion surged but assim­il­a­tion col­lapsed. Mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism became ortho­doxy not because the French right was defeated in battle, but because it sur­rendered without a fight. The men who claimed to guard the Repub­lic’s iden­tity replaced con­vic­tion with cau­tion, sov­er­eignty with sym­bol­ism, and prin­ciple with polling. They preached integ­ra­tion but allowed the par­al­lel soci­et­ies of the ban­lieues to fester, all the while insist­ing that national unity could sur­vive as a slo­gan even as it dis­ap­peared as a lived real­ity. They spoke of sec­u­lar­ism and French val­ues yet aban­doned the expect­a­tion that new­comers — like gen­er­a­tions of suc­cess­ful immig­rants before them — must adopt and uphold the shared civic and cul­tural val­ues that made France what it is.

Ger­many tells the same story. The Chris­tian Demo­crats, the CDU and its Bav­arian sis­ter party, the CSU, have been the dom­in­ant force of post­war Ger­man polit­ics. Their rule has been nearly con­tinu­ous, their influ­ence immense. Yet it was under Angela Merkel, the embod­i­ment of mod­er­a­tion, that Ger­many’s iden­tity was most rad­ic­ally trans­formed. Her 2015 decision to open Ger­many’s doors to over a mil­lion migrants was not an act of the left. It was an act of the con­ser­vat­ive estab­lish­ment. It was done not in the name of ideo­logy but of mor­al­ity, and therein lies the irony: the mor­al­ism of the centre-right has been no less destruct­ive than the uto­pi­an­ism of the left. Merkel’s ges­ture, however well-inten­tioned, frac­tured the European con­sensus, destabil­ized domestic polit­ics, and sent an unmis­tak­able sig­nal to the world that Europe’s bor­ders were optional. She gov­erned as if sen­ti­ment could sub­sti­tute for sov­er­eignty, and Ger­many is still pay­ing the price.

Ger­many tells the same story. The Chris­tian Demo­crats, the CDU and its Bav­arian sis­ter party, the CSU, have been the dom­in­ant force of post­war Ger­man polit­ics. Their rule has been nearly con­tinu­ous, their influ­ence immense. Yet it was under Angela Merkel, the embod­i­ment of mod­er­a­tion, that Ger­many’s iden­tity was most rad­ic­ally trans­formed. Her 2015 decision to open Ger­many’s doors to over a mil­lion migrants was not an act of the left. It was an act of the con­ser­vat­ive estab­lish­ment. It was done not in the name of ideo­logy but of mor­al­ity, and therein lies the irony: the mor­al­ism of the centre-right has been no less destruct­ive than the uto­pi­an­ism of the left. Merkel’s ges­ture, however well-inten­tioned, frac­tured the European con­sensus, destabil­ized domestic polit­ics, and sent an unmis­tak­able sig­nal to the world that Europe’s bor­ders were optional. She gov­erned as if sen­ti­ment could sub­sti­tute for sov­er­eignty, and Ger­many is still pay­ing the price.

Across Europe, sim­ilar pat­terns repeat. The so-called con­ser­vat­ive parties in Bri­tain, Spain, Italy, and Scand­inavia have all held office for long stretches of time. They could have reversed course, tightened unfettered immig­ra­tion, restored national pride, and reas­ser­ted the cul­tural norms that bind a people together. Instead, they chose cow­ardice cloaked in civil­ity. They cour­ted respect­ab­il­ity and the approval of edit­or­ial boards, ter­ri­fied of being called cruel or reac­tion­ary. Their guid­ing prin­ciple became “not to be hated,” as if a soci­ety could be saved without con­front­a­tion. They gov­erned as man­agers, not as lead­ers, as admin­is­trat­ors of decline and cus­todi­ans of decay. They inher­ited insti­tu­tions built by stronger lead­ers and allowed them to crumble out of fear that renewal might offend.

Across Europe, sim­ilar pat­terns repeat. The so-called con­ser­vat­ive parties in Bri­tain, Spain, Italy, and Scand­inavia have all held office for long stretches of time. They could have reversed course, tightened unfettered immig­ra­tion, restored national pride, and reas­ser­ted the cul­tural norms that bind a people together. Instead, they chose cow­ardice cloaked in civil­ity. They cour­ted respect­ab­il­ity and the approval of edit­or­ial boards, ter­ri­fied of being called cruel or reac­tion­ary. Their guid­ing prin­ciple became “not to be hated,” as if a soci­ety could be saved without con­front­a­tion. They gov­erned as man­agers, not as lead­ers, as admin­is­trat­ors of decline and cus­todi­ans of decay. They inher­ited insti­tu­tions built by stronger lead­ers and allowed them to crumble out of fear that renewal might offend.

Canada and the United States have not been immune to the same dis­ease. In Canada, the Pro­gress­ive Con­ser­vat­ives and later the fed­eral Con­ser­vat­ive Party presided over the codi­fic­a­tion and expan­sion of offi­cial mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism, a policy that, under suc­cess­ive Lib­eral and Con­ser­vat­ive gov­ern­ments alike, trans­formed national iden­tity from something shared into something merely man­aged. Brian Mul­roney enshrined mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism as a corner­stone of Cana­dian polit­ical con­sensus. Stephen Harper, though more cau­tious, did little to chal­lenge its assump­tions. The Con­ser­vat­ives spoke of integ­ra­tion but fun­ded the same bur­eau­cra­cies of frag­ment­a­tion. Even in oppos­i­tion, they sup­por­ted the immig­ra­tion policies advanced by Lib­eral gov­ern­ments, even when evid­ence showed integ­ra­tion was fal­ter­ing and hous­ing, health care, and wages were suf­fer­ing. And let it be said plainly: this is not a rejec­tion of immig­ra­tion itself — immig­ra­tion has built and enriched Canada — but a rejec­tion of immig­ra­tion without expect­a­tion, without integ­ra­tion, and without the insist­ence that new­comers join a com­mon civic nation rather than reside in par­al­lel ones.

Canada and the United States have not been immune to the same dis­ease. In Canada, the Pro­gress­ive Con­ser­vat­ives and later the fed­eral Con­ser­vat­ive Party presided over the codi­fic­a­tion and expan­sion of offi­cial mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism, a policy that, under suc­cess­ive Lib­eral and Con­ser­vat­ive gov­ern­ments alike, trans­formed national iden­tity from something shared into something merely man­aged. Brian Mul­roney enshrined mul­ti­cul­tur­al­ism as a corner­stone of Cana­dian polit­ical con­sensus. Stephen Harper, though more cau­tious, did little to chal­lenge its assump­tions. The Con­ser­vat­ives spoke of integ­ra­tion but fun­ded the same bur­eau­cra­cies of frag­ment­a­tion. Even in oppos­i­tion, they sup­por­ted the immig­ra­tion policies advanced by Lib­eral gov­ern­ments, even when evid­ence showed integ­ra­tion was fal­ter­ing and hous­ing, health care, and wages were suf­fer­ing. And let it be said plainly: this is not a rejec­tion of immig­ra­tion itself — immig­ra­tion has built and enriched Canada — but a rejec­tion of immig­ra­tion without expect­a­tion, without integ­ra­tion, and without the insist­ence that new­comers join a com­mon civic nation rather than reside in par­al­lel ones.

South of the bor­der, the Repub­lican party tells a sim­ilar story. For dec­ades, it has thundered about illegal immig­ra­tion while quietly enabling legal migra­tion on a massive scale. Ron­ald Reagan, the icon of mod­ern Amer­ican con­ser­vat­ism, gran­ted amnesty to mil­lions in 1986 under the Immig­ra­tion Reform and Con­trol Act, declar­ing it a one-time cor­rec­tion that would fix the prob­lem forever. It did not. The bor­der remained por­ous, and the pre­ced­ent was set. Later Repub­lican admin­is­tra­tions prom­ised tough­ness but delivered mana­geri­al­ism: walls half-built, enforce­ment half-hearted, rhet­oric dis­con­nec­ted from res­ults. Even when they con­trolled Con­gress and the White House, Repub­lic­ans flinched from using power to reform a sys­tem that rewards chaos. They were ter­ri­fied of the media, of cor­por­ate donors, of their own moral uncer­tainty.

South of the bor­der, the Repub­lican party tells a sim­ilar story. For dec­ades, it has thundered about illegal immig­ra­tion while quietly enabling legal migra­tion on a massive scale. Ron­ald Reagan, the icon of mod­ern Amer­ican con­ser­vat­ism, gran­ted amnesty to mil­lions in 1986 under the Immig­ra­tion Reform and Con­trol Act, declar­ing it a one-time cor­rec­tion that would fix the prob­lem forever. It did not. The bor­der remained por­ous, and the pre­ced­ent was set. Later Repub­lican admin­is­tra­tions prom­ised tough­ness but delivered mana­geri­al­ism: walls half-built, enforce­ment half-hearted, rhet­oric dis­con­nec­ted from res­ults. Even when they con­trolled Con­gress and the White House, Repub­lic­ans flinched from using power to reform a sys­tem that rewards chaos. They were ter­ri­fied of the media, of cor­por­ate donors, of their own moral uncer­tainty.

They gov­erned as if the ques­tion of who enters and who belongs were a mat­ter of eco­nom­ics, not of iden­tity. The res­ult has been a steady erosion of social cohe­sion and the rise of pop­u­lism as the only force will­ing to name what the estab­lish­ment right refused to con­front.

The great tragedy is that the right once under­stood the moral dimen­sion of civil­iz­a­tion. It under­stood that a nation is not just a col­lec­tion of indi­vidu­als but a cov­en­ant between gen­er­a­tions, bound by memory and duty, by a shared story and shared oblig­a­tions. But over time, the con­ser­vat­ive parties of the West became lib­eral parties with slower reflexes. They adop­ted the lan­guage of com­pas­sion, the theo­logy of glob­al­ism, the logic of mar­kets, and the esthet­ics of restraint. They preached prudence while prac­tising abdic­a­tion. Their idea of sta­bil­ity was to man­age the revolu­tion rather than res­ist it. Every time they were given power, they prom­ised to cor­rect the excesses of the left, and every time, they merely admin­istered them more effi­ciently.

The great tragedy is that the right once under­stood the moral dimen­sion of civil­iz­a­tion. It under­stood that a nation is not just a col­lec­tion of indi­vidu­als but a cov­en­ant between gen­er­a­tions, bound by memory and duty, by a shared story and shared oblig­a­tions. But over time, the con­ser­vat­ive parties of the West became lib­eral parties with slower reflexes. They adop­ted the lan­guage of com­pas­sion, the theo­logy of glob­al­ism, the logic of mar­kets, and the esthet­ics of restraint. They preached prudence while prac­tising abdic­a­tion. Their idea of sta­bil­ity was to man­age the revolu­tion rather than res­ist it. Every time they were given power, they prom­ised to cor­rect the excesses of the left, and every time, they merely admin­istered them more effi­ciently.

It is no acci­dent that pop­u­lism has risen from the ruins of this betrayal. People were not seduced by extrem­ism; they were aban­doned by mod­er­a­tion. When cit­izens looked to the main­stream right for pro­tec­tion from mass migra­tion, from cul­tural dis­sol­u­tion, from the erosion of mean­ing, they found bur­eau­crats instead of believ­ers. They found a polit­ics of hes­it­a­tion, a cow­ardly cent­rism that wor­shipped pro­cess and feared con­vic­tion. And so the right’s greatest sin was not malice but weak­ness. It mis­took com­prom­ise for vir­tue, con­sensus for peace, and delay for wis­dom. In the end, it was the polite right that gave the left its vic­tor­ies, one con­ces­sion at a time.

Con­ser­vat­ives must face this truth without eva­sion. The West is not being under­mined by its enemies alone. Blame its care­takers, those who thought they could pre­serve civil­iz­a­tion by yield­ing its sub­stance while keep­ing its name. The crisis of the West is there­fore not only moral or cul­tural but polit­ical. It is the col­lapse of a con­ser­vat­ive tra­di­tion that lost the cour­age to con­serve. Until the right admits its com­pli­city and redis­cov­ers the vir­tue of defi­ance — rooted not in exclu­sion, but in the defence of the shared civic and cul­tural inher­it­ance that new­comers are wel­come to join and strengthen — it will remain unfit to lead. For repent­ance must pre­cede redemp­tion, and only when the right stops excus­ing its own fail­ures can it begin the work of renewal.

Write a comment…

How the right went wrong

CONSERVATIVES UNWITTINGLY HELPED THE LEFT UNDERMINE THE WEST

• National Post
• 15 Nov 2025
• ANTHONY KOCH

For years, conservatives have comforted themselves with the illusion that the destruction of the West was entirely the doing of the left. They have blamed progressive ideologues, globalists, and utopians for the failed experiment of multiculturalism, the open borders that reshaped their nations, and the cultural relativism that hollowed out the moral foundations of their societies. But this is self-deception. The truth is that the socalled right, the respectable suit-and-tie centre-right parties that governed most of the West for the better part of the last half-century, are just as responsible for the decay of our civilization as their left-wing counterparts. They were not innocent observers. They were in power, and they made the choices that brought us here.

In France, the Gaullists and their successors ruled for decades under various names: the RPR, the UMP, and now Les Républicains. For much of the Fifth Republic’s history, the right, or what passed for it, held the presidency, the legislature, or both. And yet what did they conserve? Immigration surged but assimilation collapsed. Multiculturalism became orthodoxy not because the French right was defeated in battle, but because it surrendered without a fight. The men who claimed to guard the Republic’s identity replaced conviction with caution, sovereignty with symbolism, and principle with polling. They preached integration but allowed the parallel societies of the banlieues to fester, all the while insisting that national unity could survive as a slogan even as it disappeared as a lived reality. They spoke of secularism and French values yet abandoned the expectation that newcomers — like generations of successful immigrants before them — must adopt and uphold the shared civic and cultural values that made France what it is.

Germany tells the same story. The Christian Democrats, the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, have been the dominant force of postwar German politics. Their rule has been nearly continuous, their influence immense. Yet it was under Angela Merkel, the embodiment of moderation, that Germany’s identity was most radically transformed. Her 2015 decision to open Germany’s doors to over a million migrants was not an act of the left. It was an act of the conservative establishment. It was done not in the name of ideology but of morality, and therein lies the irony: the moralism of the centre-right has been no less destructive than the utopianism of the left. Merkel’s gesture, however well-intentioned, fractured the European consensus, destabilized domestic politics, and sent an unmistakable signal to the world that Europe’s borders were optional. She governed as if sentiment could substitute for sovereignty, and Germany is still paying the price.

Across Europe, similar patterns repeat. The so-called conservative parties in Britain, Spain, Italy, and Scandinavia have all held office for long stretches of time. They could have reversed course, tightened unfettered immigration, restored national pride, and reasserted the cultural norms that bind a people together. Instead, they chose cowardice cloaked in civility. They courted respectability and the approval of editorial boards, terrified of being called cruel or reactionary. Their guiding principle became “not to be hated,” as if a society could be saved without confrontation. They governed as managers, not as leaders, as administrators of decline and custodians of decay. They inherited institutions built by stronger leaders and allowed them to crumble out of fear that renewal might offend.

Canada and the United States have not been immune to the same disease. In Canada, the Progressive Conservatives and later the federal Conservative Party presided over the codification and expansion of official multiculturalism, a policy that, under successive Liberal and Conservative governments alike, transformed national identity from something shared into something merely managed. Brian Mulroney enshrined multiculturalism as a cornerstone of Canadian political consensus. Stephen Harper, though more cautious, did little to challenge its assumptions. The Conservatives spoke of integration but funded the same bureaucracies of fragmentation. Even in opposition, they supported the immigration policies advanced by Liberal governments, even when evidence showed integration was faltering and housing, health care, and wages were suffering. And let it be said plainly: this is not a rejection of immigration itself — immigration has built and enriched Canada — but a rejection of immigration without expectation, without integration, and without the insistence that newcomers join a common civic nation rather than reside in parallel ones.

South of the border, the Republican party tells a similar story. For decades, it has thundered about illegal immigration while quietly enabling legal migration on a massive scale. Ronald Reagan, the icon of modern American conservatism, granted amnesty to millions in 1986 under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, declaring it a one-time correction that would fix the problem forever. It did not. The border remained porous, and the precedent was set. Later Republican administrations promised toughness but delivered managerialism: walls half-built, enforcement half-hearted, rhetoric disconnected from results. Even when they controlled Congress and the White House, Republicans flinched from using power to reform a system that rewards chaos. They were terrified of the media, of corporate donors, of their own moral uncertainty.

They governed as if the question of who enters and who belongs were a matter of economics, not of identity. The result has been a steady erosion of social cohesion and the rise of populism as the only force willing to name what the establishment right refused to confront.

The great tragedy is that the right once understood the moral dimension of civilization. It understood that a nation is not just a collection of individuals but a covenant between generations, bound by memory and duty, by a shared story and shared obligations. But over time, the conservative parties of the West became liberal parties with slower reflexes. They adopted the language of compassion, the theology of globalism, the logic of markets, and the esthetics of restraint. They preached prudence while practising abdication. Their idea of stability was to manage the revolution rather than resist it. Every time they were given power, they promised to correct the excesses of the left, and every time, they merely administered them more efficiently.

It is no accident that populism has risen from the ruins of this betrayal. People were not seduced by extremism; they were abandoned by moderation. When citizens looked to the mainstream right for protection from mass migration, from cultural dissolution, from the erosion of meaning, they found bureaucrats instead of believers. They found a politics of hesitation, a cowardly centrism that worshipped process and feared conviction. And so the right’s greatest sin was not malice but weakness. It mistook compromise for virtue, consensus for peace, and delay for wisdom. In the end, it was the polite right that gave the left its victories, one concession at a time.

Conservatives must face this truth without evasion. The West is not being undermined by its enemies alone. Blame its caretakers, those who thought they could preserve civilization by yielding its substance while keeping its name. The crisis of the West is therefore not only moral or cultural but political. It is the collapse of a conservative tradition that lost the courage to conserve. Until the right admits its complicity and rediscovers the virtue of defiance — rooted not in exclusion, but in the defence of the shared civic and cultural inheritance that newcomers are welcome to join and strengthen — it will remain unfit to lead. For repentance must precede redemption, and only when the right stops excusing its own failures can it begin the work of renewal.